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Migration, Identity and Integration in Eurasia

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Introduction

Migration has always played a significant role in the integration of Eurasian societies. Diverse cultures have interacted in this vast landmass and impacted on each other's social lives and created a certain degree of commonness. This paper focuses on migration into and out of Central Asia and its role in identity formation and integrative tendencies. Right since Tsarist colonisation Central Asia has been host to waves after waves of migration from various regions of Eurasia, mostly from the Slavic areas. If Tatars introduced Jadidism, Russians and other Slavic population brought socialism, modernisation and transformed a section of the population into Russified elite. The immigrants were not immune to the local influence either. The presence of non-indigenous groups also sharpened in some ways the boundaries of ethnic identity, leading at times to violent conflicts. Nevertheless, a process of integration was taking shape through this process of contact, though it was more visible among the educated urban population. Migration trend has also undergone change, with exodus of first the Slavic population and recently even the indigenous population. The latter, which during the Soviet period was reluctant to move beyond its rural frontiers, is now prepared to travel long distances to work in Russia. This trend has positive and negative consequences for identity issues as well as integrative tendencies in the region. This paper argues that handled properly, labour mobility within Eurasia can help in the growth and development of the entire region.

Migration and Identity during the Soviet period

The influence of culture and tradition was an important variable in the process of migration of Central Asians during the Soviet period. Large families, social traditions and attitude towards women participation in social production played a major role in influencing the demographic behaviour of the Central Asians and their mobility outside their traditional spatial environment. Early marriages, attitude to abortion and a strong propensity for large families resulted in high birth rate among Central Asians. While traditionalism perpetuated large families, the existence of large families in return kept people confined to rural traditional environment. Central Asia, thus, was caught in a vicious cycle in which traditionalism, high birth rate, low mobility and lack of skill reinforced each other. The complex social norms of a traditional society encouraged an individual to associate and identify oneself with a defined ethnic environment. In the process it helped the reproduction of traditional values and social norms.

Despite the rise in underemployment and unemployment, pressure on land and rural income, Central Asians were reluctant to search for work beyond their immediate surrounding.¹ Under market conditions, loss of land and employment becomes the basis of rural out-migration. But under conditions of a certain level of security of employment and state provision of social services, labour mobility could not simply be a function of economic forces.

Post-Soviet migration trends

Soviet disintegration and subsequent transition to a market economy dramatically changed the migration scenario in Central Asia. When the economy declined and federally funded industries closed down, security of employment and income also went. The Russians left Central Asia in large numbers to resettle in Russia. Villages also witnessed steady migration to urban areas for work and since the late 1990s migrant indigenous labourers from Central Asia searching for work in Russia has dominated the migration trend.

Russians were mostly in modern and large-scale industrial enterprises, funded and controlled by the Union during Soviet times. The break up of the Union hit those enterprises hardest - metallurgy industry in Kyrgyzstan, aluminium industry in Tajikistan, oil and chemical industry in Turkmenistan, chemical, metallurgy, aircraft industry in Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan had 196 large-scale industrial enterprises related to military production. In the aftermath of Soviet collapse, such enterprises could hardly keep operating. Industries like the

Petropavlovsk heavy machine-building plant, Kubyshev in Pavlodar and Kirov works in Ust-Kamenogorsk, suffered heavily and had to layoff of thousands of workers since independence. This adversely affected the population of these cities, which are largely Russian.ⁱⁱ

Between 1989-2002, Russian population declined by 59.8 percent in Tajikistan, 30.0 percent in Uzbekistan, 29.4 percent in Turkmenistan, 26.7 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and by 20.1 percent in Kazakhstan.ⁱⁱⁱ As Russians migrated out of Central Asia in large numbers, schools and institutions of higher learning and training started to shut down.^{iv}

The loss of Slavs does not make the society any less heterogeneous nor imparts greater stability to independent statehood. Russians worked as a buffer between many competing sub-national tendencies and their contribution to national economy helped the state to pepper over internal divisions through socio-economic mobility of the population in general.

Migration of Central Asians to Russia

Russian emigration from Central Asia has slowed down considerably since late 1990s. Instead, many indigenous Central Asians are migrating to Russia in large numbers. These are mainly unskilled workers looking for jobs in Russia. Tajikistan, the poorest country in the region has been a major supplier of seasonal labour to Russia. According to official sources including Russia's Federal Migration Service and Interior Ministry, there were in 2004 about 600,000-800,000 Tajik migrant labourers in Russia of which 90 percent were illegal workers. Kyrgyz migrants to Russia numbered about 300,000 in 2003, according to official statistics. Only 5,000 were registered legally.^v

There have also been movements of workers within Central Asia, especially to Kazakhstan from neighbouring countries due to its oil-driven economic growth. Even poorer areas in Central Asia attract impoverished people from neighbouring countries, who leave their homes in search of work even for a pittance. South Kyrgyzstan, which itself is underdeveloped and is reeling under difficult socio-economic conditions, is a destination for illegal labour migration from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The use of migrant labourers has the potential to spark unrest in south Kyrgyzstan by pushing wages further down, adding to local unemployment and social tension. This region was already a scene of inter-ethnic riot between Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups in 1989-90.^{vi}

Surviving on extremely harsh conditions, cheated by local agents, faced with intimidation and psychological pressure from local nationalist groups as well as from law enforcement authorities in Russia, the migrants enjoy no social and human rights since most of them are illegal in official parlance. They have been detained without legal aid, deported, attacked and even killed by local racist elements. Migrant workers have been targets of vilification campaign due to the presence of some elements among them who take to drugs trafficking and crime. Popular abhorrence to religious terrorism also makes the Central Asians targets of suspicion in Russia.

Nevertheless, Eurasian migration flow is going to intensify for a variety of reasons. Historical legacy, demography, and present economic situation dictate movement of people from Central Asia to Russia or within Central Asian countries. Migration to a large extent can benefit the sending as well as the receiving country, if the states find ways to legalise the movement of peoples and harness the vast human resource potentiality available in Eurasia. Otherwise, the illegal channels of migration, middlemen, corrupt state officials etc. would diminish the economic benefit of migration on both ends and create more social, inter-ethnic and even inter-state problems.

Historical Legacy and Eurasian identity

Slavs and Central Asian Turkic peoples have interacted for centuries. During the Tsarist and subsequent Soviet rules, cultural contacts intensified. The shared history, geography and culture of Slavs and Central Asians prompted Olzhas Suleimenov to advance the thesis as early as in 1976 that the Turkic and Slavic tribes of early mediaeval times had shared one culture and so were a kind of brother peoples. He vigorously argued that Turks and Slavs can and should work together to create a great confederation of separate states, or, a single secular state, based on their shared heritage, history and culture.^{vii}

Large-scale industrialisation since the 1950s brought a large number of urban, skilled Russians as well as members of other ethnic groups came in large numbers to Central Asia.^{viii} Soviet urbanisation created in Central Asia a modern bi-lingual (referred also to as Russophone) indigenous urban elite. In many ways it also helped the nation-building process in Central Asia. Ronald Wixman, after a series of interviews conducted in Uzbekistan in 1985, concluded that the indigenous city population was self-assured and confident, proud of their cultural heritage and cherished their own language, culture and history, while adapting to modern culture. They saw themselves as educated and ‘capable of carrying out all the tasks of a modern nation’.^{ix}

Scholars like Serwyn Bialer, Roman Szopurluk etc. pointed to the development of “a new type of intense, urban-centred ethnic identity” to the extent non-Russian regions were modernised.^x Between a quarter and a third Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Tajik population and half of the Kazakhs claimed good knowledge of Russian language in 1989 as compared to 15-20 percent in 1970 (only among Kazakhs the share was about 42 percent).

Inter-ethnic marriages also resulted in culturally mixed families. Among the Kyrgyz 6.9 percent of men and 6.1 percent women marrying in 1988 had spouses outside their nationality and for the Turkmen the figures were 9.0 percent and 3.9 percent respectively.^{xi} Between a quarter to one-third of the Russians living in Central Asia were married outside their nationality.^{xii} Interestingly, Russian immigrants to Central Asia tended to have more children on average than Russians in Russia.^{xiii}

Russians in Central Asia have a greater sense of belonging to the region than is assumed. Some scholars have pointed to the different value systems of Russian immigrant from Central Asia and local Russians. According to Filonyk, it has been difficult for the Russians from Central Asia to reintegrate with their co-ethnics in the Russian federation. As example he cites the case of the Rostov region in Russia, where the immigrant ethnic Russians from Central Asia are regarded as “Central Asians” or “outsiders”.^{xiv}

Russians from Central Asia are characterised by less drinking habits, hard work and stronger family orientation etc. This makes it difficult for them to adjust to a society that is characterised more by exactly the opposite values.^{xv} In fact, many migrants who left did come back to Central Asia finding it difficult to adjust to conditions outside. For example, in 1994 alone, 70,000 returned to Kazakhstan, of which 30,000 were Russians.^{xvi}

Central Asian states have moved a long way since the days of inter-ethnic riots in the 1989-90 and nationalist euphoria following independence. The impact of Russian emigration can be quite detrimental to the economies of newly independent states of Central Asia and it is difficult to visualise any language-based discrimination in the near future. Essentially Russian remains the language of inter-ethnic communication.

Kazakh president Nazarbaev has advanced a vision of *Eurasianism* that highlights the closeness of the multi-ethnic population that resides in its territory. *Eurasianism* is the recognition of the continent's multi-cultural heritage and the formative historical role of the Turkic peoples in this heritage.

In short, the ethno-national situation today is less acrimonious, the economy is better than before and the need of retaining the skilled minority population is being underlined. This has resulted in relaxations of the provisions of the language law (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have given official status to Russian language). In most cases, Central Asian states are making efforts to prevent identity from becoming a source of making group boundaries rigid. In fact, Russian exodus from Central Asia has slowed down and is likely to remain moderate in the future.

Economic and Demographic imperatives

While emigration of Russians dropped significantly, that of indigenous population has been witnessed on a big scale in Central Asia since the 1990s. Difficult economic situation in countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has resulted in migration of rural population to Russia to escape unemployment and low wages. Between half and four-fifths of the population in Kyrgyzstan live below poverty line and the average salary in 2001 was \$27 a month. In Tajikistan average wages are less than a fifth of the 1989 level and in 2003 was \$7 a month. Every four out of five rural population live in poverty. Unemployment according some estimates is as high as 40 percent (the official level is 10 percent).^{xvii}

According to Vasily Kravtsov, the deputy head of the external migration section of the migration service department of the Kyrgyz foreign ministry, Russia acts as a safety valve for those who would find it difficult to be employed in an 'already strained labour market'. The 300,000 or so migrant workers to Russia support nearly 1.2 million population at home (five dependants per migrant worker on average) out of a total population of 5 million in Kyrgyzstan. According to Russia's ambassador to Tajikistan, Maksim Peshkov, each year Tajiks working in Russia send home \$250 million. "Labour migration and Tajik-Russia relations"^{xviii}

Labour migration to Russia also economically benefits that country, particularly due to population trends in Russia. Demographically, both Central Asia and Russia compliment each other. While the former is largely a labour surplus area, Russia has suffered from labour deficit since the end of the Second World War and in the post-Soviet period from a steady decline in total population, including a substantial fall in number among working-age population. By 2002, Russia's population had declined to about 144 million, from a peak of 148.7 million in 1992.

In fact, fall in immigration and the demographic trend has prompted some to suggest that migration hardly can make up for the population decline in Russia. This view implies that there is much more scope for migration to Russia. Preventing Central Asian migrant workers may hit the Russian economy hard in the future.^{xix} Many analysts have underlined that the economic imperatives of migrant labour in Russia is such that it would be difficult to meet Russia's labour demands without their participation. To avoid becoming a high-wage economy, when the country is still struggling to get out of the impact of Soviet disintegration and subsequent economic crisis in 1998, Russia has to meet the fall in internal sources of labour-supply by labour migration from the 'near abroad'.^{xx}

Migration in Eurasia is more for economic reasons than due to factors like negative inter-ethnic relations or socio-cultural discrimination or general atmosphere of insecurity. Given a certain level of economic security, Russians may not move out of the region, where many Russian families have lived for generations. Central Asia's economic revival would not

only help retain the skilled workforce, but even the illegal labour migration of the unskilled Central Asians would sufficiently slow down.

Economic integration

In October 2000, three countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) along with Russia and Belarus signed an agreement setting up the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) in Astana.^{xxi} A major aim of the exercise seems to be creation of a stronger economic bloc. The members of the Eurasian Economic Community pledged to form a common foreign-trade border, create a unified foreign economic policy and collectively regulate export-import tariffs and prices. The new organisation is also to work towards the establishment of common customs, fiscal, monetary, and employment policies.

Russia and Kyrgyzstan have been discussing ways of writing off Kyrgyzstan's \$180 million foreign debt, mainly to the Paris Club. Debt for equity arrangement is being arranged, especially in the military-industrial facilities. Already 37.6 percent stake in the Dastan factory that is the only kind in the CIS that produces the Shkval VA-111 torpedo has been sold to Russian companies. Another example is the acquisition of 100 percent equity in Kazakhstan's second largest cellular operator Kar-Tel by VimpelCom, one of the top three Russian cellular operators, in lieu of the former's \$75 million debt apart from paying \$350 million..^{xxii} Russia and Kazakhstan negotiated a bilateral deal in 2000 that gave Russia's EES electricity network a half-share in a Kazakhstan power plant to settle a \$300-million debt.^{xxiii}

According to reports, LUK Oil investments in Kazakhstan has already touched \$1.5 billion. Russia's Iskar-GAZ Automobile plant (GAZ) owns a controlling stake in Isker-GAZ in Almaty, which assembles mini vans and small trucks. Another plant, AgroMash Holding acquired the Kostnonai Diesel Plant (KDZ) in March 2003 and the former, a major producer of agricultural equipment planned to invest \$12.7 million in 2003-04 to restore KDZ production facilities (in Soviet times it produced 40,000 diesel engines a year) by late 2005.^{xxiv}

Uzbekistan has entered into closer energy co-operation with Russia with a production sharing agreement (PSA) of \$1 billion for 35 years. LUK Oil in a joint venture with Uzbekneftgaz is to create a company (90 percent owned by the former) to develop the Kandym gas field to be shared equally, though LUK Oil is to provide the bulk of the investment of \$1 billion. Gazprom has already signed a PSA to develop gas fields in Uzbekistan to the tune of \$15 billion between 2004-07. Russia's dairy and meat holding companies have been active in Uzbekistan as well. William-Bill-Dann (WBD) bought one of Uzbekistan's largest dairy plants, Toshkent Surt in 2004 and plans to invest \$7.5 million. Russia's largest meat holding company Chekizovskii is in the process of acquiring Tashkentgusht, Uzbekistan's largest meat processing plant, at a price of \$1million dollars and investment obligations of \$11 million. Golden Telecom announced in June 2004 that it has purchased for \$2.8 million 54 percent of Uzbekistan's only fixed-line communication operator. A Strategic Partnership Treaty under Uzbekistan's initiative was signed between Putin and Karimov on 16 June 2004 to strengthen economic military co-operation by granting each other on a mutual basis maximum favourable conditions for participation in investment and privatisation projects.^{xxv}

State policies on migration

Eurasian integration requires not just capital flows but also movement across borders of peoples, who have in the past lived as citizens of one political entity and shared many things in common. Like the Russians who can contribute to the economic regeneration of Central Asia, ethnic Central Asians can similarly meet the labour needs of Russia and help in its economic growth. Therefore, Russia and the Central Asian states need to look beyond capital, technology and services flows to utilise the man-power potentiality of the Eurasian region. They need to create conditions for movement of peoples in a manner that is not detrimental either to the interests of the states or to that of the immigrants.

Given the demographic and economic compulsions, historical and geographic links, migration in Eurasia is going to be a long-term reality and may even increase in future as

Russia feels more demographic pressure. However, there is an urgent need to avoid the negative fall outs of illegal labour migration, which includes rise of racist attitudes in Russia, criminal and terrorist elements among migrants from Central Asia and violation of human rights of genuine migrant workers. The governments of both receiving and sending countries need arrangements whereby they can streamline migration that can protect the interests of both sides.

The general labour market of the member states should support free movement of labour, provide social guarantees in work conditions, guarantee equal conditions of pay, safety, medicine and insurance, and provide educational and other benefits. Some advocate regulation of migration within EURASEC through such measures as a legal and regulatory framework, inter-state agreements for sending workers abroad and hiring of seasonal workers, a system of services for promoting sending of labour abroad. IOM's Chief of Mission in Central Asia, Frederic Chenais, argues that stronger regulations are required not just to protect the rights of the migrants but also the sending and receiving countries.^{xxvi}

Eurasian integration efforts through such organisations as Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) have not yet put in place conditions for the free movement of capital, freight, labour and service, according to Tajik President Rakhmonov. This could have been prompted by the decision of other members (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) to introduce passport requirement for Tajik migrants from 1 July 2005.^{xxvii}

States in the region have tried to restrict the flow of migrant workers through coercive methods, which has not really helped in checking illegal migration and exploitation of migrant workers. Kazakhstan has been working on a quota system to contain the influx of foreign labour.^{xxviii}

Another example is that of Kyrgyzstan, which in 2001 introduced quotas to regulate hiring of foreign workers and protect domestic labour market. Employers need government permission, pay a fee for hiring foreign workers and make payment to the social security fund. Since this process is extremely bureaucratic and expensive, hiring illegally continues.^{xxix}

The Kyrgyz government also withdrew in January 2001 the regulation related to licensing activity of firms. These earlier acted as legal intermediaries for labour migration. As a result, migrants, employers and intermediaries function only illegally, underlines Kakoli Rey, the head of IOM in Kyrgyzstan.

A strict new Russian citizenship law of May 2002 makes acquisition of citizenship very difficult with requirements like five-year residency, demonstrable fluency in Russian and evidence of a legal job.^{xxx}

There have been efforts, especially in recent years to enter into bilateral agreement on the issue of labour migration. Tajikistan has been working for an agreement with Russia on labour migrants. Both sides have completed all inter-state procedures and the agreement is expected to be signed soon.

Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed protocols in 1996 and again in 2003 to facilitate the registration of labour migrants and their legalisation in Russia. The protocol of 2003 seeks to override the negative consequences of Russia's 2002 migration policy changes, by providing some preferential treatment for Kyrgyz migrants and provide them with better life and social protection. Freeing of Russian employer from paying an insurance fee as a guarantee for return of Kyrgyz worker, waiving of five-year residency requirement for Kyrgyz self-employed (vendors, for example) in Russia to register as a private entrepreneur. Kyrgyz nationals can work for two years (foreign citizens in Russia can get a work contract for one year) with the option of extending their contract for one more year.^{xxxi}

Kyrgyzstan also signed an agreement with Kazakhstan in 2003 on the protection of labour migrants, working in agriculture in the border regions. A prominent private employment agency was allowed to deal with the problem of Kyrgyz migrants in Kazakhstan. But no such agreement exists with Uzbekistan or Tajikistan.^{xxxii}

Uzbekistan's response to migration has been stricter border controls, which does not prevent illegal migration in any case and makes life difficult for the poverty ridden populace which can find some employment in neighbouring states. As an alternative to this method, some NGOs like Centre Supporting Civic Initiative advocate establishing an official labour exchange on the border that can by charging a fee help a migrant worker to submit necessary documents, find a job and also help employers find suitable workers.^{xxxiii}

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has played a significant part in alleviating the plight of migrant workers in the region. It has been working in close co-ordination with the governments, facilitating inter-governmental contacts and broadly helps in creating conditions for the legalisation and protection of migrants. IOM, in collaboration with Kyrgyz foreign ministry's migration department and the Golden Goal public youth organisation has been issuing security passports to those temporarily leaving for Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The passport contains information about the regulations of entry and departure, staying in and departure from the above three countries, and also the list of diplomatic representative offices in Kyrgyzstan of those three countries.^{xxxiv}

Conclusion

Russians and Central Asian have shared a geographical space that also was marked by many cultural linkages over centuries. In the Soviet period this integration process got further strengthened through population mobility and use of Russian language. In the post-Soviet period Russia and most Central Asian states have come closer for security and economic reasons. Russia also wants ethnic Russians to live in Central Asia without discrimination. While Central Asian countries need skilled man-power, which ethnic Russian living there can provide to a large extent, Russia needs Central Asian labour for the growth of its own economy.

Russians in Central Asia have influenced the local society as much as they have been influenced by it. Given better conditions - economic, political and cultural - they are less likely to opt for migration out of Central Asia, where many of them have their ancestry going back to generations. They have over the decades contributed to the progress of the society in whatever way they could and constitute an essential component of reconstruction and future development of Central Asia. In many ways the Central Asians have also been influenced by Russian culture and way of life. The bridge that links Russians and Central Asians needs to be sustained and strengthened. Multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identity of Russia and Central Asia are their strength and by drawing upon the creative potentialities of all the communities living there can the Eurasian region make rapid strides towards a prosperous future.

Finally, Eurasian integration can be intensified not just by the flow of capital and services, but also of labour. Economic integration of Eurasia can improve the socio-economic condition and labour market in Central Asia. However, the real integration would happen with the optimal utilisation of the labour resources of the entire region. The states involved need to evolve policies and enter into mutual agreements that will make labour movement transparent, legal and free from exploitation as well as beneficial to both the sending and the receiving country. Failure to do so can create conflict situations in future. Successful harnessing of the man-power potentiality of the entire Eurasian region is a major factor in its future integration.

ⁱ One out of five able-bodied adults in Uzbekistan did not work in the public sector. Their number was nearly 70,000. In Ferghana province of the republic alone, there were 20,000 unemployed in 1989. *Pravda*, 14 October 1989, p.3; *Izvestia*, 16 June 1989, p.3

ⁱⁱ Andrei Kortunov, Yuri Kulchik and Andrei Shumikhin, "Military development in Kazakhstan: goals, parameters, and implications for Russia", in Sagdeev and Eisenhower (eds.), op.cit., pp.128-29.

ⁱⁱⁱ The share of Russians in 1989 was 7.6% in Tajikistan, 8.3% in Uzbekistan, 9.4 % in Turkmenistan, 21.4% in Kyrgyzstan and 38.5% in Kazakhstan. Timothy Heleniak, "Migration of the Russian diaspora after the breakup of the Soviet Union", *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2004, pp.109-113.

^{iv} According to experts from the Institute for Development of Kazakhstan, in the first five years since independence there was on an average a loss of 60% highly qualified specialists in the administrative structure. A sharp shortage of supervisory cadres is felt all levels of the power structure as also a high rate of labour turnover among state employees. Askar Zh. Shomanov, "Social modernisation of Kazakh society", *Contemporary Central Asia*, New Delhi, Vol.1, No.1, 1997, p.9.

^v "Tajikistan - Labour migration from Tajikistan drops as economy improves", BBCMonitoringService, 16.04.2004, http://tcc.iom.int/iom/artikel.php?menu_id=45&artikel_id=224&history_back=true; *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newslines*, Vol.8, no.185, Part I, 29 September 2004; *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, no.202, Part I, 25 October 2004; *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, no. 206, Part I, 1 November 2004; "Kyrgyzstan: New protocol with Russia offers protection for labour migrants", *IRIN*, Ankara, 6

October2003, http://tcc.iom.int/iom/artikel.php?menu_id=45&artikel_id=67&history_back=true

^{vi} http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=36527&SelectRegion=CENTRAL_ASIA; "Many faces of migration in Eurasia", *RFE/RL Central Asia Report*, Vol. 4, No. 40, 15 June 2004

^{vii} Martha Brill Olcott, "Kazakhstan", in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union*, Florida, 1994, 1994, p.128

^{viii} For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the share of non-Kyrgyz had gone up from 33.2% in 1926 to 47.6% in 1989, which included 26.1% non-Russians. In Uzbekistan, in 1989, non-Uzbeks comprised 29% of the population, including about 21% non-Russians. The same year non-Kazakhs constituted 60.3% of the population in Kazakhstan, including 22.5% non-Russians.

^{ix} Ronald Wixman, "Ethnic attitudes and relations modern Uzbek cities", in William Fierman (ed.) *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, Boulder, 1991, p. 181.

^x Alexander Motyl, op.cit., pp. 93-95.

^{xi} USSR Statistics Committee's Report, "Interethnic marriages", cited in *Pravda*, 12 October 1989, p. 2

^{xii} *Naselenie SSSR 1988*, pp.204,319

^{xiii} Helen Desfosses Cohn, "Population policy in the USSR", *Problems of Communism*, Vol.22, No.4, 1973, p.47

^{xiv} Alexander O. Filonyk, "Kyrgyzstan", in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), op.cit., pp. 153-54.

^{xv} Smith, Graham, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr and Edward Allworth (eds.), *Nation-building in the post-Soviet Borderlands*, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 208-09.

^{xvi} John Anderson, *The International Politics of Central Asia*, Manchester, 1997, p. 151; *ITAR-TASS News Agency*, Moscow, 26 January, 2000.

^{xvii} "Fertile Fields: Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia", op.cit., pp. 22-23)

^{xviii} "Kyrgyzstan: New protocol with Russia offers protection for labour migrants", *IRIN*, Ankara, 6 October 2003, http://tcc.iom.int/iom/artikel.php?menu_id=45&artikel_id=67&history_back=true; Other estimates put the figure between \$800 million and \$1.2 billion, "Labour migration and Tajik-Russia relations", *RFE/RL Central Asia Report*, Vol. 4, No. 23, 15 June 2004; "Labour migration: masses on the move" *RFE/RL Central Asia Report*, Vol. 4, No. 38, 13 October 2004

^{xix} According to participants in a conference in Moscow in November 2004, in-migration from abroad compensates for only 3.2 percent of the domestic decline.

^{xx} Paul Goble, "Population decline by two villages every day", *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, no. 219, Part I, 22 November 2004; Timothy Heleniak, "Migration dilemmas haunt post-Soviet Russia", *Migration Policy Institute*, October 2002, www.migrationinformation.org; John B. Dunlop, "Will the Russians return from the near abroad? *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol.35, no.4, 1994, p.213; *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, no.202, Part I, 25 October 2004; (Asia Plus-Blitz, 7 July 2004; *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, no.127, Part I, 8 July 2004

^{xxi} EURASEC, formed in October 2000 at a CIS summit in Kazakhstan and ratified in Minsk in May 2001, has its origin in a series of free-trade and custom agreements concluded within the CIS and is structured on the framework of a 1996 Customs Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan first signed a tripartite customs agreement in 1995. Kyrgyzstan joined the group the same year and in 1996 a Customs Union and a Treaty on Integration was signed in 1996. Tajikistan joined in 1998). Russia has 40 per cent of the voting rights and is supposed to cover 40 per cent of the budget. Kazakhstan and Belarus contribute 20 per cent of the budget and has a similar vote share. The other two have 10 per cent each.

^{xxii} *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, No.106, Part I, 7 June 2004; *RFE/RL Central Asia Report*, Vol.4, no.34, 14 September 2004

^{xxiii} Sergei Blagov, "Kazakhstan looks to Russia amid hail of western criticism", Eurasia Insight, *Eurasianet*, <http://eurasianet.org>, 19 February 2003.

^{xxiv} *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, no.106, Part I, 7 June 2004; *RFE/RL Central Asia Report*, Vol.4, no.24, 23 June 2004

^{xxv} *RFE/RL Central Asia Report*, Vol.4, no.24, 23 June 2004

^{xxvi} ^{xxvi} Roza Zhalimbetova and Gregory Gleason, "Migrant labour, Labour rights, and the Eurasian Economic Community", Research Report published in *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, Vol.1, no. 1, 2002, http://cess.fas.harvard.edu/cesr/html/CESR_01_1.html#Zhalimbetova;

IRIN, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=34987&SelectRegion=CENTRAL_ASIA

^{xxvii} Though such a requirement was to come into effect from 1 January 2005, Russia agreed to allow those Tajik living in Russia time till 1 April, a decision which was estimated to benefit about one million Tajiks by giving them more time to acquire proper travel documents. *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol.8, no.106, Part I, 7 June 2004

^{xxviii} Roza Zhalimbetova and Gregory Gleason, op.cit.

^{xxix} http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=36527&SelectRegion=CENTRAL_ASIA

^{xxx} E. Nikolayev, "Labour migration in Kyrgyzstan", *ICB*, 27 March 2002, http://eng.gateway.kg/cgi-bin/page.pl?id=268&story_name=doc2302.shtml

^{xxxi} "Kyrgyzstan: New protocol with Russia offers protection for labour migrants", *IRIN*, Ankara, 6 October 2003, http://tcc.iom.int/iom/artikel.php?menu_id=45&artikel_id=67&history_back=true

^{xxxii} http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=36527&SelectRegion=CENTRAL_ASIA

^{xxxiii} *ibid.*

^{xxxiv} "Kyrgyzstan - IOM, Kyrgyz body issue "security passports" for migrants", *BBC*

Monitoring Service, 09.08.2004, http://tcc.iom.int/iom/artikel.php?menu_id=45&artikel_id=269&history_back=true