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ON THE GENEALOGY OF TERRORISM

by

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**The terrorist and the policeman both come from the same basket. Revolution,
legality — counter-moves in the same game; forms of idleness at bottom identical.**

Joseph Conrad, *The Secret Agent* (1907, ch. 4)



ON THE GENEALOGY OF TERRORISM

The 9-11-2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, New York City, was a “defining moment,” and not only for George Bush. One can debate whether it was an “act of war,” “asymmetric warfare,” “terrorism,” or a “crime against humanity.” We do know that the Bush administration defined 911 as an act of international terrorism and declared a global war on terrorism (GWOT). Terrorists such as Osama bin Laden were portrayed as implacable foes that had to be tracked down, fought and destroyed.¹ Of course, these definitions did not go uncontested. Some people defined those involved in the attack as freedom-fighters, heroes and martyrs engaged in a ‘righteous’ struggle against a villainous ‘superpower.’²

This paper presents the results of a genealogy of the discourse of terror. When and where did this discourse emerge? How has it functioned in power struggles since it emerged? And finally, how has it functioned since the 9-11 attacks? It describes how the *political* concept of terrorism first entered the English language during the French Revolutionary era, and how it has functioned in the changing contexts of British and American imperialism. It argues that describing political actors as ‘terrorists’ rather than as ‘soldiers,’ criminals or insurgents has important social consequences.

The use of ‘terror’ to describe political violence is itself a calculated political act that needs to be critically examined (Jackman 2002). In the midst of power struggles like wars or campaigns, political leaders must engage in rhetorical acts and ritual practices that move people to collective action. Central to these activities are political victimage rituals and the rhetorical practices of subjection, the constitution of villainous and heroic power subjects

(Blain 1988; 1994; 2005). Political victimage rituals are staged public events like speeches, press-conferences, State-of-the-Union addresses, parades and demonstrations, mass rallies, trials, executions, military operations that provide political actors with a platform on which to vilify and attack opponents and glorify heroic struggle.

Defining one's political adversaries as 'terrorists' is a powerful rhetorical means to vilify opponents, and legitimate and motivate acts of political violence and domination. A good illustration of this pattern is the way U.S. news organizations report the Israeli / Palestinian conflict. A study by *Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting* (FAIR 2002) found that ABC, CBS, and NBC most frequently would describe the motivation behind Israel's military attacks against Palestinians as retaliation for past acts of Palestinian terrorism (28 September 2000 – 17 March 2002: ABC = 64%; CBS = 79%; NBC = 93%). This implies that Israeli attacks on targets in the occupied territories were acts of 'self-defense.' The Palestinians were portrayed as 'terrorists' and almost never as 'freedom fighters' engaged in a guerrilla war to end an illegitimate Israeli occupation. As we shall see, this is also evident in the Bush Administration's justifications for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both were defined as responses to the 911 terrorist attacks and as military campaigns in a global war against terrorism in the name of freedom (i.e., "Operation Enduring Freedom" and "Operation Iraqi Freedom," respectively). The under-reported but predictable civilian casualties were defined as "unfortunate accidents" or "collateral damage."

POWER AND SUBJECTION

A genealogy traces the emergence and descent of new concepts like political terrorism to changes in power relations and the emergence of new fields of knowledge. The analysis that follows is grounded in a Foucauldian account modernity, one that emphasizes the changing

character of power and knowledge associated with the practices of ‘government’ in modern liberal societies (Foucault 2000; Gordon 1991; Rose, 1999). Therefore, the constitution of the concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ are traced to the problematic of governing ‘liberal societies’ and the constant threat of civil war, class conflict, and revolutionary violence. The crux of the issue is that the first ‘liberal societies’ were themselves constituted through political violence and terrorism –the English civil war, American War of Independence, the French revolution. In turn, these struggles constituted a tradition that continues to inspire movements of resistance to tyranny and domination. Therefore, governing a ‘free people’ who can claim a legitimate right to engage in revolutionary violence in the name of freedom, poses special problems, including the constant danger of insurrection.

Terror was no longer exclusively associated with the Sovereign’s right to take life, dramatically visible in the spectacular victimage rituals of public torture, but with the democratic threat of revolutionary violence from below. From its inception in the 18th Century, the ‘social movement’ has been associated with the threat of violent resistance to tyranny and domination (Tarrow 1998). Hence, there was a practical political need to differentiate illegitimate from legitimate forms of political violence. Political violence by the police and military would have to be differentiated from illegitimate forms of ‘criminal’ or ‘terrorist’ violence. Two consequences have flowed from this. First, state terror was hidden away in enclosed spaces and kept secret to mask the scandalous face of naked violence –the prison, Abu Ghraib, Guantánomo Bay, interrogation centers, etc. And second, there was a need for new modes of knowledge such as the social sciences that would focus on the regulation of society and the individual (e.g., Comte invented positivist sociology to counter the excesses of the French Revolution, see Nisbet 1943).

At the same time, a different but similar set of problems were occasioned by the need to administer colonial empires. Edward Said's (1978; 1993) studies of Western imperial power relations with the Orient (including, Islamic Orient) and the genealogy of an "Orientalist discourse," document the interplay of Western imperial power and knowledge. According to Said (1978), underlying the different units of Orientalist discourse (i.e., "the vocabulary employed whenever the Orient is spoken or written about" (p. 71), is a set of representative figures or tropes. The Orient represents the contrast to the West. Among the many ways this opposition has been expressed, the most extreme had been the image of conquering Islamic movements. For example, the images of Osama bin Laden, Palestinian terrorists, and suicide bombers, constitute the contrasting representative figures defining an essential difference. Where Islam was concerned, European fear, if not always respect, was in order. There were sound historical reasons why Islam came to symbolize terror, devastation, and the demonic hordes of hated barbarians. The European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was a way of containing the Orient. The crusades were represented as a polemical confrontation of militant Christian Crusaders with Islamic devils, a dramatic deliverance of from from civilization's enemy. Islam represented ignorance, despotism, slavery, base servitude. Hence, Muslim Orientals had to be conquered and controlled (Said 1978, p. 172).

In some respects, one difference between the problems of governing liberal and colonial societies, is that the spectacular legacy of Sovereign terror survives in "Shock and Awe" military campaigns as well as the use of torture in intelligence gathering. The 'enemies' of Empire, as Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 37) observe, have often been called terrorists:

Today military intervention is progressively less a product of decisions that arise out of the old international order or even U.N. structures. More often it is dictated unilaterally

by the U.S., which charges itself with the primary task and then subsequently asks its allies to set in motion a process of armed containment and/or repression of the current enemy of Empire. These enemies are most often called Terrorist, a rude conceptual and terminological reduction that is rooted in a police mentality.

If this account of the origins and functioning of this “rude conceptual and terminological reduction” is credible, it should be possible to establish these correlations in the etymological record of the English language. Focusing on the semantics of terror in the English language is clearly warranted by the enormous historical impact of Anglo-American imperialism.

GENEALOGY AS POLITICAL ETYMOLOGY

First, a brief methodological word on the use of etymology in genealogical analysis is in order. Genealogy is a perspective on how human practices and interpretations change (see Foucault 1977; also 1970, Ch. 10, pp.381-382). . Most famously, it is an approach derived from Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1887) *On The Genealogy of Morals*. In it, Nietzsche posed the following question: “What light does linguistics, especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?” Nietzsche uses etymologies to show how a change in moral concepts is evident in the history of the words that designate good and bad, and good and evil (i.e., the memorized links between these words and specific meanings). Shifts in the meanings associated with these terms, Nietzsche proposed, resulted from changing power relations. Their meanings could be deciphered by asking “Who speaks?” By correlating the speakers with the spoken, the deeper meaning masked by the shift from good vs. bad to good vs. evil could be uncovered. For example, the Pagan rulers equated ‘good’ with ‘nobility’ and bad with ‘mediocrity’; the Jewish / Christian priests redefined ‘good’ in opposition to Pagan thought by equating good with ‘humility’ and evil with ‘pride.’

More recently, Edward Rose has developed a way of researching changes in theory that involves a similar use of etymologies (Rose et al. 1994; also Carlin 1999). While his approach does not emphasize power relations, it does not preclude such an analysis. It does suggest that new categories like terrorism and terrorist would have been invented for practical reasons. Words allow us to talk about persons and society, and act in a social world. The total set of these terms constitute what Rose calls a natural sociology (i.e., common sense). For example, Rose (1960) used the detailed and precisely dated etymologies and quotes that can be found in the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)* to examine the natural sociology of the English language, e.g. culture, institution, society, norm, status. He found two things. The meanings of these words had been relatively stable for hundreds of years. And almost all of the technical vocabulary of sociology was in use prior to the rise of 19th century sociology.

Words can change in two ways: 1) old words (bottles) can acquire new meanings (wine), and 2) new words (bottles + wine) can be invented (Allan & Burridge 1991). Words can acquire new meanings by being rearticulated with different terms. Take the English word ‘revolution’ as an example. According to *OED* its earliest meaning (c1390) is related to “the movement of celestial objects” in the Astronomical discourse of the time. In 1600 the same word is associated with a new meaning. Revolution is related to the “the complete overthrow of an established government.” Similarly, one of the first concepts of a ‘movement’ (1390) is elaborated in terms of ‘revolution’ and ‘Astronomy.’ It was rearticulated in military terms by 1784, and acquired its modern political sense in the early 1800s (e.g., “Actions of a body of persons” 1828). As we shall see, a new political concept of ‘terror’ appeared in the English language in the 1790s during the French Revolution. By adding suffixes to terror, two new words were created: terrorism and terrorist, and two new objects of thought were constituted.

In short, the Nietzschean question has been interpolated in the following way: “What light does linguistics, especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of terror concepts?” This question is addressed employing the etymologies provided by the *OED* ((for its limits, see Willinsky 1994).

CHANGES OF ‘TERROR’

The English word terror derives from Middle English *terroure*, from Old French *terreur*. The Old French *terreur* was derived from the Latin noun, *terror*, and the verb, *terre*, which is translated into English as “to frighten.” Chart #2 represents the *OED* etymology of terror by glossing each concept and placing it in historical period. Each distinct *OED* sense, as indicated by main branch (numbers) and each sub-branch (small case letters), is operationally defined as constituting a distinct concept. There are five concepts of terror *n* (including *combinations*), three concepts of a terrorist *n*. and *adj.* as a political term, two concepts of terrorism as system, and two concepts of terrorize *v.*. All but three of the thirteen distinct concepts (excluding combinations) appeared during and after the French Revolution.

(Place Chart #1 about here)

Pre-revolutionary ‘terror’. The early English terror concepts are not explicitly political. Of course, this does not mean they were not used to describe what we might think of as power relations (i.e., religion, kings, etc.). The earliest terror concept refers to an individual’s state of being (1375). Terror is synonymous with being ‘greatly frightened’ or an ‘intense fear or dread.’ This is still its most frequent use in American English.³ The first three *OED* quotes are religious, e.g., “The terrors of death are fallen upon me” (1560). The second, causal concept (#2a) first appears in the 1500s. Terror is used to describe an action or quality of something that causes dread or intense fear: a person (1375), “the Messiah cloathed with so

much Terrour and Majesty” (1667), “the ferocious Bedoweens” (1788), the night (1834), etc. Fiction is specifically mentioned, as in Gothic “tales of terror” (1834). In 1598 terror is used in combination with war (#5), “Curses...through the sterne throate of terror-breathing warre” (#5), which anticipates its later political associations. Finally, a third religious concept appears in the 1611 edition of the Bible, the book of Job. The “king of terrours” is “Death personified.”

These associations reflect the characteristics of a regime of absolute sovereignty, the Law, the Divine Right of Kings to take life and impose the ultimate sanction of death—the king of terror. Terror is imposed from on high. The English revolution dates from 1600, when the issue of Absolutism was resolved in favor of an uneasy balance of power with Parliament. Henceforth, the monarchy would devote itself to an absolute sovereignty over its colonial empire.

At the same time, according to Foucault, a new form of political power had began to develop in the 16th Century, one based on the principle of ‘*Omnes et Singulatin*’, a practice which leads to a political sovereignty of all and each. This new governmental rationality represented a daemonic coupling of the Ancient Greek ‘city-game’ and the Christian ‘shepherd-game’ (Gordon 1991).

(Place Table #1 about here)

The distribution of new political terms represented in Table #1 trace the linguistic correlates of these events. In the 17th century the Western European Monarchies sought an ‘absolute sovereignty’ over their territories (i.e., state and colony) by centralizing control of their populations and subjects. To accomplish this objective, they instituted a whole range of new ‘governmental’ systems—policies and police, centralization of information and Statistics—to govern their populations more effectively (Giddens 1985). A well-disciplined

and docile population, it was thought, would enhance in a multiplicative way, the Sovereign's political power. This project produced a whole new set of concept-objects. These included the population, society, economy, and polity (Gordon 1991). At the same time, these changes also provoked revolutionary struggles, a political critique of tyranny, and a demand for democratic "liberties." Liberalism was the great intervening event inaugurating the birth and functioning of the modern nation-state. The aim was to limit the power of the 'tyrants' to tax, conscript, arbitrarily punish, etc, and to expand the power of the 'people' to influence the laws and policies of the state. From this power struggle emerged a new 'liberal' mode of political power emerged, one that emphasized practices and techniques for ruling 'free' subjects. At the same time, there was a practical need to defuse the potential for "civil war" and clearly differentiate categories of legitimate and illegitimate political violence. "Society must be defended" from the menace of revolutionary terrorism (Foucault 2003). Terrorism is an illegitimate form of political violence because it is democratic (arising from the 'people,' the 'mob', 'the dangerous classes', or 'criminals') and revolutionary (a direct challenge to the powers that be).

Revolutionary 'terror'. The building of the modern state and its governmental regime, did not happen 'peacefully' (see Giddens' (1985) account, Ch. 7: "Administrative Power, Internal Pacification). These efforts engendered violent resistance. The 'tyranny' of police state terror, public executions and spectacular tortures, played a decisive role in the 'pacification' of the people (Foucault 1977). The development of a capitalist economy in the 18th century produced new 'liberal' actors and class networks, a print industry and literary culture, and the material means to contend with the new tyranny (Tarrow 1998). The 'social movement' as a new political form emerged as a *democratic* counter to the strategy of

‘absolute sovereignty’ and the tyranny that it produced. The Monarchs were vilified as ‘tyrants’ and their governmental policies as ‘tyranny.’ The American War of Independence (1776) and French Revolution (1789-1795), fought in the name of the individual liberty and rights, were potent signs of this new democratic threat from below.

(Place Table #2 about here)

Table #2 presents the distribution of new concepts of political violence broken down by historical period. All twenty-four concepts of tyranny were elaborated prior to the French Revolutionary era (<1789). As mentioned before, the concept of political revolution emerges during the English civil war (1600) and new concepts continue to be added. Interestingly, while terror was part of the repertoire of English terms available to describe the violence associated with the English and American struggles, it was not used for that purpose. At least in the English language, it is the French revolution that permanently associates revolutionary violence and the threat from below to terrorism and terrorists. The first explicitly *political* concepts of terror in the English language refer directly to the French Revolution (1789-94). Henceforth, then, the modern concept of political terrorism, including its prior associations with ‘intense fear’ and religious associations with ‘death,’ are inextricably bound up with illegitimate revolution.

One of the three new concepts of terror that results from the French revolution, is that of a “Reign of Terror” (1801, #4). *OED* provides a brief historical note to contextualize the concept:

4. reign of terror, a state of things in which the general community live in dread of death or outrage; esp. (with capital initials) French Hist. the period of the First Revolution from about March 1793 to July 1794, called also the Terror, the

Red Terror, when the ruling faction remorselessly shed the blood of persons of both sexes and of all ages and conditions whom they regarded as obnoxious.

Several points about this change should be noted. First, this concept refers to a state of the ‘general community,’ not an individual state of being. Second, this ‘general community’ lives in dread of repression by a ‘ruling faction” that engages in ‘organized intimidation.” OED states that this concept is applied to other episodes of ‘remorseless repression in various countries,” or simply to “a similar period of repression.” Finally, the earlier associations to the word do not disappear. They accumulate. The new political use includes the earlier association to ‘intense fear’ and ‘death.’ Moreover, the use of ‘reign’ ties ‘terror’ to the violence of absolutist monarchy. This association is reinforced by the religious concept of Death as “the king of terrors.”

The other two new terror concepts that appeared at the time of the revolution are marked by morphological changes: terrorist (1795 1a) and terrorism (1795 #1). The suffix -ist is used to mark some special feature of an agent, a specialist like a sociologist for example, or an adherent of specific doctrine, a Marxist. The first use of ‘terrorist’ was a specific reference to the Jacobins and their agents in the French Revolution, especially those involved with the Revolutionary tribunals during the “Reign of Terror.” The quotes illustrating this concept emphasize that terrorists are ‘cruel’ and act with ‘merciless severity.’ They are described as “Hell-hounds...let loose on the people” (1795). The idea that terrorists attack the people as opposed to legitimate authority, is a key to its illegitimacy as a form of political violence.

The association between government, the people, and revolutionary terror was explicitly articulated by Maximilien Robespierre:

In times of peace, virtue is the source from which government of the people takes its power. During the Revolution, the sources of this power are virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror will be a disaster; and terror, without which virtue is powerless (Speech delivered to the Convention, Feb. 5, 1794, “Report on the Principles of Public Morality,” Hachey & Weber 1972, p. 17).

In response to this new ‘terrorist’ threat, governments were forced to differentiate ‘legitimate’ state-sponsored political violence from its ‘illegitimate’ uses. Henceforth, the use of ‘police terror’ deployed by governments would generally be defined as legitimate uses of the police and military ‘force,’ and violence directed against established governments or colonial regimes would be vilified as ‘terrorist.’

Post-Revolutionary ‘terror’. The French revolution was a watershed event in human history, spawning a new culture of political practices that would exert an enormous and ‘dangerous’ international influence (Hunt 1984). The Napoleonic wars involved much of Europe; the British would defeat the French at Waterloo in 1815. Once the British are dominant, their attention increasingly turns to extending and maintaining the Empire. It has been estimated that British armies were involved in fifty colonial wars between 1803 and 1901 (Giddens 1985, p. 223). Henceforth, any movement in the colonies, for example Irish republicans, would be smeared with the charge of terrorism and vilified as terrorists.

The etymological record establishes the following associations. In the second half of the 19th century, a second sense of a political ‘terrorist’ emerges (#1). It was generalized to ‘any one who attempts to further his views by a system of coercive intimidations.’ The first quote makes reference to a Wexford (i.e., Irish Republican) terrorist (1866). In the 1880s it was specifically applied to members of one of the ‘extreme revolutionary societies in Russia.’

During World War II it was applied to “Jewish terrorists in Palestine” (1947). Since the 1960s, it was used to vilify the “ultra-left” groups like the Weather Underground and Baader-Meinhoff gang.

In the wake of the French Revolution, British politicians and imperial administrators frequently used ‘terror’ terminology to vilify any organized resistance to their rule. According to Said’s analysis of British imperial practices, Orientalist [Islamic] knowledge would completely merge with the British voice of empire (Said 1978, p. 196).

By the beginning of the 20th Century, casting ones political opponents in the role of terrorist had become a standard polemical tactic. The reference to the Wexford Irish Republican indexes the long history of British denunciations of its anti-colonial adversaries as terrorist. Ironically, both Adolf Hitler and Winston Churchill used it to describe their opponents. In *Mien Kampf* (1971: 40) Hitler asserted “...they [workers, social democrats, Jews] made use of the weapon which most readily conquers reason: terror and violence.” In World-War II, “terror-bombing” would become an official Allied military strategy for defeating the Germans and the Japanese. After the war, the British would smear the Mau Mau movement organized by WW II veterans against British imperial rule in Kenya as terrorist (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005). The same pattern is observable in the Algerian struggle against French colonial rule in Algeria, as described in Franz Fanon’s (1963) *The Wretched of the Earth* and Gillo Pontecorvo’s (1966) movie, *The Battle of Algiers*.

Toward the end of Said’s (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*, he makes several suggestive comments on the links between Western imperialism, the rise of a discourse of Islamic terrorism in the 1980s, and powerful amplifying function of the globalized media of mass

communication. He asserts that the mass media generate imagined communities that influence international discourse and knit far-flung communities together:

Take as a case in point the emergence of 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism' as two key terms of the 1980s. For one, you could hardly begin (in the public space provided by international discourse) to analyze political conflicts involving Sunnis and Shi'is and Iraqis, or Tamils and Sinhalese, or Sikhs and Hindus -- the list is long -- without eventually having to resort to the categories and images of 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism,' which derived entirely from the concerns and intellectual factories in metropolitan centers like Washington and London. They are fearful images that lack discriminate contents or definition, but they signify moral power and approval for whoever uses them, moral defensiveness and criminalization for whomever they designate. These two gigantic reductions mobilized armies as well as dispersed communities.... (p. 309)

Terrorism is synonymous with abnormality, extremism, and the antonym to the West, representing normality, moderation and rationality. These vilifications function to mobilize consent, to eradicate dissent, to promote a blind patriotism. By such means, the governability of masses is achieved, and the multitudes whose potentially disruptive desires for democracy and freedom are held down (or narcotized). The fear induced by these exaggerated images of menacing terrorist and fundamentalist 'devils' help insure the individual's subordination to the dominant norms of the moment.

TERRORISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

The emergence of the 'social' and 'society' as objects of administrative and scientific knowledge, were part and parcel of a strategy to cope with the dangers of revolutionary terror

and civil war. Donzelot (1991, 1993) has demonstrated how the constant threat of class warfare and terrorism influenced the constitution of the 'social' as an object of administrative and social scientific knowledge in 19th Century France. Two interpretations were elaborated in the language of "rights" in 19th century France. The working class demanded "equal rights" for justice -- equal sovereignty of all, while the capitalist class defended the notions of "individual responsibility and liberty." The notion of "solidarity," a central concept in Durkheim's sociology, was elaborated to resolve the antinomies inherent in these two interpretations. Paul Rabinow's (1989) detailed study of concepts of space and society, and power and knowledge in France from the 1830s through the 1930, documents the dynamic interplay of these concepts and French colonial practices.

The correlation between the practical need to anticipate and manage the threat of revolutionary terror and the rise of social science, is made explicit in the recent report by the Gulbenkian Commission chaired by Immanuel Wallerstein, *Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences*, which notes the following:

In many countries, certainly in Great Britain and France, it was the cultural upheaval brought about by the French Revolution that forced a certain clarification of the debate. The pressure for political and social transformation had gained urgency and a legitimacy that could not easily be contained any longer simply by proclaiming theories about a supposedly natural order of social life. Instead many argued that the solution lay rather in organizing and rationalizing the social change that now seemed to be inevitable in a world in which the sovereignty of the 'people' was fast becoming the norm, no doubt hoping thereby to limit its extent. But if one were to organize and

rationalize social change, one had first of all to study it, and understand the rules which governed it. There was not only space for, but a deep social need for, what we have come to call social science. Furthermore, it seemed to follow that if one were to try to organize a new social order on a stable base, the more exact (or 'positive'] the science, perhaps the better. With this in view, many of those who began to lay the bases of modern social science in the first half of the nineteenth century, most notably in Great Britain and France, turned to Newtonian physics as a model to emulate. (p. 8)

This pattern was reproduced in the power / knowledge relations in US imperialism in the Post-WW II era. Timothy Luke (1989) shows how the emergence of the 'political culture' concept in American political science was related to the exigencies of US imperial activities in the second half of the 20th century, especially the threats posed by 'communist insurgencies' in the developing world. Luke argues that U.S. hegemony coincided with "the data gathering revolution in the social sciences." Prior to WW II American political scientists had focused on the problem of 'making citizens.' Post-1945, the focus shifts to 'political culture' and 'political socialization' in comparative perspective. This new 'data gathering' coincided with the infamous Project Camelot (see Horowitz 1965). This was a research program financed by the Department of Defense between 1963 and 1965 to study the nature and causes of revolutions in Third World countries. The clear intent was to inform CIA covert operations and military interventions around the world in order to contain revolutionary or independence movements that threatened US interests. At the time, this provoked political controversy with Latin American governments and an ethical controversy among U.S. social scientists about the propriety of participating in sponsored research of this kind.

President George Bush's declaration of a global war against terrorism after the September 2001 attacks represents the latest twist in the genealogy of terrorism. The reverberations in the field of social science knowledge soon follow. On March 30, 2004, ASA ChairLink Listserv e-mailed the following communiqué: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FUNDING. The purpose of this funding would be to establish two campus-based Centers for Excellence (\$7.5 million to each center). "One Center will address the 'Psychology of Terrorism' and one will address the 'Social Impact of Terrorist Events.'" A second announcement followed on July 6, 2004: "Department of Homeland Security Announces \$12 Million Funding for Social and Behavioral Scientist to Study Terrorism." Proposals are solicited for establishing a university-based Center of Excellence in Behavioral and Social Aspects of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism.

The results of these developments have been reported in a front page article appearing in the February 2005 edition of *Footnotes*, the official newsletter of the American Sociological Association, "Fighting International Terrorism with Social Science Knowledge" (Ebner 2005). "Social scientists, including numerous sociologists," the article begins, "will unite in defense of national security." A new center will be established at the University of Maryland-College Park. It will be dedicated "to reducing terrorism worldwide." The leader of the research team, University of Maryland criminologist Gary LaFree, is quoted: "This may be the social science equivalent of the Manhattan Project." And, he continues, "Too often, policymakers have had to counter terrorists on the basis of assumptions and guesstimates. Our job will be to give them more solid information to work with." The article does not mention the sticky ethical issues these activities raise, regarding social science in the service of Empire or the 'governability' of the people (Khalidi 2005).

ENDNOTES

¹ In contrast to Bush, the *New York Times* put a face on a shadowy enemy that could function to legitimate and motivate a “war on terrorism.” A search of the *New York Times* archive for articles containing Bin Laden’s name produced 918 articles and 183 headlines from 9-11 to 12-31-2001. By comparison, a search from Jan 1, 2001 through 9-11, produced 211 articles and 21 headlines containing his name (See Chart #1). He was frequently described as ‘evil,’ ‘extreme,’ and ‘fanatical,’ and as “taunting” Americans and “gloating” about his success. Tom Friedman, the influential *New York Times* middle-east correspondent, described him as a “Muslim Charles Manson with the organizational skills of Jack Welch” (Friedman 2002a, 2002b).

² In an open statement placed on the *Reuters News Service* website, the editors cautioned their reporters to avoid the use of ‘terrorist’, arguing that “one person’s ‘terrorist’ may be another person’s ‘freedom fighter.’”

³ The *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (2002) includes terror in a list of synonyms: fear, fright, dread, terror, horror, panic, alarm, dismay, consternation, trepidation. These nouns denote the agitation and anxiety caused by the presence or imminence of danger. Fear is the most general concept. Terror is specifically used to signify an intense, overpowering fear.

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**CHART # 1:
NUMBER OF NYT ARTICLES CONTAINING
NAME & TERROR, 1/96 – 12/02**




Chart #2: OED Etymology of 'terror', n.^α

SIGNIFICATIONS

Terror n. a. F. <i>terreur</i>	}	1 c1375 state of being greatly afraid	2a 1528 things causing dread, spec. fiction	3 1611 <i>Bible</i> King of ___ Death personified	2b 1883 trivially, person / occas.	4 1801 <i>F. Rev.</i> Reign of Terror	5 1941 Comb. bombing	
Terrorist n. a. F. <i>terroriste</i>	}				<u>As political term</u>			
					1a 1795 <i>F. Rev.</i> Jacobins	1b 1866 member of org. spec. R. rev. society		
						2 1803 Dyslogistically one who alarms	3 1803 attrib. 1801 terrorist-party 1850 adj. terroristic	
Terrorism a. F. <i>terrorisme</i>	}				<u>As system</u>			
					1 1795 <i>F. Rev.</i> government / party			
Terrorize v.	}				2 1798 gen. Policy	1 1856 trans. to coerce/deter		
						2. 1856 intr. maintain power by [after tyrannize]		
<u>PERIOD (#)</u>		1300 (1)	1400 (0)	1500 (1)	1600 (1)	1700 (3)	1800 (7)	1900 (0)

^α Source, *OED On Line*, based on Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 1989, plus editions.

Table #1
 Year of First 'Political' Concepts in *OED* by Century and Date

<u>Word</u>	<u>Century</u>						
	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900
tyranny						1375	
tyrant						1297	
state (29a)				1538			
government				c1566			
politician				1589			
minister (#3)				1625			
revolution				1600			
revolutioner [-ary]					1695		[1850]
terrorism						1795	
terrorist						1795	
police force						1800	
policeman						1839	

Table #2
 Number of New *OED* Concepts of Political Violence by Historical Period

<u>Word</u>	Period		
	<u><1789</u>	<u>1789-1815</u>	<u>>1817</u>
tyran- + [suffixes]	24	0	0
revolution + [suffixes]	6	7	5
terror + [suffixes]	0	6	3
