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Attitude measurement is no longer fashionable among sociologists. About 50 years ago this was different. Young students of sociology here in Sweden read George A. Lundberg’s textbook in research methods where several chapters dealt with Likert Scales and Thurstone Scales for measuring attitudes. A diligent student was expected to tell you everything about the internal consistency criteria of Likert Scales and the equal-appearing intervals of a Thurstone Scale. A visiting lecturer from the USA could suddenly drop down here in Sweden with the latest news about developments in attitude scaling, the Guttman Scale with its cumulative, ordinal logic. Later I myself made extensive use of Guttman Scales in my own research.

But why measure attitudes at all when attitudes turn out to be so weakly correlated with actual behaviour? To me as a student the weak correlation between verbal attitudes and actual behaviour was an interesting challenge to be met and tackled. In Measurement and Prediction, one of the thick volumes emerging from post-war research on the American Soldier, we were told that one main reason for that weak correlation might be ‘intervening circumstances’ external to the attitude, preventing individuals from actually behaving as expected from their attitudes. If we could control for those ‘intervening circumstances’ we might be able to identify situations where actual behaviour indeed could be predicted from attitudes.

However, there is another set of circumstances internal to the very nature of attitudinal structures that also might be significant on this point. An attitude is not always a simple and homogenous matter but indeed a structure, a semantic field made up by several ingredients: (1) favourable or unfavourable verbal statements, (2) referents denoted by these statements, (3) cognitive and emotive dispositions focussed on (1) or (2) or both, thus providing descriptive or emotive meanings to the language of the given semantic field.
In trying to make sense of my notions of varieties of attitudinal structure, I came across a book by the American philosopher Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (1944), who introduced me to a distinction between dependent and independent emotive meaning. This distinction took account of the fact that the emotive dispositions prevailing in a semantic field could be focussed mainly on the verbal ingredients of that semantic field – words or statements or rhetoric – or alternatively on the referents of those words or statements.

An attitude is defined as having an “independent emotive meaning” if it is more emotionally gratifying for a person to vindicate or rally around the purely verbal symbols involved in expressing that attitude than to deal cognitively or in action with the referents, the very objects of that attitude. This can also be called a purely “expressive” way of having an attitude or a preference. On the opposite end of this scale we find persons whose attitudes exhibit a “dependent emotive meaning”. Their verbally expressed attitudes are not dissociated as gratifying symbols from the referents of those attitudes, but depend for their emotional meaning on what you comprehend and what you feel with regard to those referents or objects themselves. This scale of independent versus dependent emotive meanings of an attitude I did at that time call the L-scale – but later I rebaptized it as the KEY-scale distinguishing hi-KEY and lo-KEY persons.\(^1\) Independent emotive meaning (hi-KEY) implies that the very expression of certain given words or statements do have an emotional meaning quite independently from any emotional arousal or lack of arousal with regard to the referents, i.e. the objects of those words or statements. This is perhaps like falling in love with love, forgetting about the lovely creature that you would seem to have in mind.

The concept of dependent emotive meaning, on the other hand, would imply that whatever emotional arousal you would feel in connection with a given attitudinal statement turns out to be dependent only on the emotions elicited by your facing the actual objects, the referents of the verbal attitude or symbolic ingredients involved. Stevenson’s distinction thus points to a variation of real focus of emotional response in the semantic field – either on the language, the verbal symbols, or on the actual referents denoted by that attitudinal language. Anyone who has lived in an environment loaded with religious, political or moral rhetoric or argument may have noticed this variation of focus of emotion in spite of the fact that the content would seem to have been the same in terms of everyday language.

\(^1\) Due to the fact that the label L turned out to be occupied by another, preexisting variable, I was forced to relabel my scale for measuring *Independent Emotive Meaning of Attitudes* as the KEY-scale. However in
I have constructed several $L$-scales – one referring to political attitudes, another one related to attitudes toward the legalisation of abortion, one related to attitudes regarding child-rearing practises, and another one on environmentalist attitudes. As an illustration I will here present an $L$-scale related to political attitudes (Himmelstrand 1960: 193f. For other $L$-scales, see op.cit. pp. 127 and 163.) All of these are Guttman scales, and show satisfactory coefficients of reproducibility and scalability ($Sc$). Total attitude scores for each respondent were calculated by adding up all item scores for agreements or disagreements with each item.

**TABLE 1** in about here (copy from Op.Cit. p.193f)

*Attitudes and Corresponding Behaviour*

Theoretically we can deduce quite different outcomes with regard to the relations between attitudes and behaviour due to whether or not there is a predominance of independent or dependent emotive meaning of the attitudes involved. In cases of independent emotive meaning of attitudes the correlation between attitudes and behaviour would be weaker than in cases of dependent emotive meaning. The only kind of behaviour we can expect in cases of independent emotive meaning is what I have called *symbol acts*, the act of verbally repeating and making rhetoric out of the verbal content of the attitude, but not applying it in practice. There would be no motivation left for practical application in the case of independent emotive meaning of attitudes – unless such motivation was provided from other sources than the attitudes involved, and this could be controlled for. Here below I will present the results of some empirical studies corroborating some of these theoretical predictions.

Originally I was assuming a linear negative relationship between the $L$-variable and the concordance between the given attitude and its corresponding behaviour such that persons with high $L$-values would exhibit a lower correlation between attitudes and corresponding behaviour than persons whose attitudes exhibit low $L$-values. The main emotional gratification in the latter case depends on what you think and feel in direct encounters with referents of those attitudes, in accordance with the attitude expressed. In between those two poles I expected a gradual linear change of the attitude-behaviour correlation. However, my empirical results, as shown in several projects, indicated that the highest correlation between attitude and corresponding behaviour appears among those who

papers I published earlier, and also in later publications such as this one with extensive quotes and references from my earlier publications, the label $L$-scale is of course retained.
occupy the middle of the L-scale, persons with medium-L values. This implies a curvilinear relationship between the L-scale and the degree of closeness between, say environmentalist attitudes and consumer behaviour, as indicated in Fig. 1: My empirical study in this case dealt with environmentalist issues as reflected in attitudes and behaviour.

Theoretically the kind of outcome illustrated in Figure 1, and in some other studies, can be explained in the following manner: The medium-L position is supposed to represent an involvement in a psycho-linguistic dynamic where a thorough factual knowledge and a practical know-how regarding the objective referents of symbolically expressed ideas turn out to be as important as the involvement in, and symbolic elaboration and verbal expression of these ideas themselves. There is a mutual dialectic between acts on the symbolic-ideational levels and the level of objective referents - a mutual interplay that helps to bring verbally expressed ideas, and actual behaviour or action closer together.

High-L rather represents, as explained earlier, a situation where the affective meanings of ideas and related symbols have become emotionally gratifying in themselves independently of the objective referents to which these symbols refer in a strict sense. Therefore behaviour or action with regard to these objective referents also remain rather independent of what the respondent says or endorses on the symbolic level.
In the case of Low-L the respondent is gratified mainly by relating directly to the objective referents of symbolic behaviour. Here we speak of dependent emotive meaning; the corresponding symbol acts do not have any independently gratifying power of their own, but only fulfil a representational function depending on what you think, feel or do with respect to the objective referents of symbolic behaviour. Symbolic action thus comes to represent corresponding non-symbolic action; this implies a higher correlation between symbolic and corresponding non-symbolic action than in the case of high-L (independent emotive meaning), but not as high a correlation as in the case of medium-L where there is a mutual dialectic involved where behaviour or action also can be guided and directed by ideas from the level of symbolic action.

The relevant empirical findings are reported in Table 2:

### TABLE 2: Correlation of environmentalist attitudes and corresponding behaviour by various levels of independent/dependent emotive meaning of attitudes (the L-Scale).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Low-L</th>
<th>Medium-L</th>
<th>High-L</th>
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<tr>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.36*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regression Coeff. (β)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.31*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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</table>

NOTE: The overall correlation between the L-scale and the Behaviour scale is 0.03; and it is 0.05 between the L-scale and the Environmental attitude scale. Therefore the findings reported in Table 1 cannot be explained as a result of confounding effects. Asterisks * indicate that a correlation coefficient is statistically significant.

The consumer choice behaviour scale used in our study was based on responses to four questions which had turned up with particularly high factor loadings in a factor analysis of a much larger number of behavioural questions: Buying organically grown food even when it was priced somewhat higher; donating money to environmentalist causes; buying soda in returnable bottles, and participating in an environmentalist study group. Choice of means of transportation did not exhibit significant factor loadings in this factor due to the fact that the
physical location of living quarters and working places, and variable access to public transportation between these two places determined the choice of means of transportation rather than any environmentalist attitudes.

For further methodological references on this empirical study, see Himmelstrand 1992.

The data summarised in Table 2 clearly support our hypothesis regarding a curvilinear relationship between the L-variable, and the degree of concordance of the relevant verbal attitudes, and corresponding non-symbolic behaviour. As indicated by a lot of earlier research on correlation between attitudes and behaviour we can never expect a particularly high correlation between attitudes and corresponding behaviour due to a number of intervening factors of a physical or social nature which make it difficult, costly or sometimes impossible to implement your attitudes in actual practice. The correlation with the highest magnitude in Table 1 only amounts to + 0.36 but it is a statistically significant correlation.

Another theoretical prediction that has been made, and tested in another empirical study, deals with the amount of attitudinally relevant knowledge expected due to the degree of dependent versus independent versus dependent emotive meaning of the given attitude. I will now present empirical results from that study.

**Attitudes and Relevant Knowledge**

Due to the wishes of the sponsor who financed this study, it was carried out on a national sample of young men, 20 – 30 years of age. It dealt mainly with political attitudes, behaviour and voting but also included a scale of political knowledge regarding the meaning of a number of items that were salient but not always well known in political and economic debates at that time (the late 50s) in Sweden – concepts such as credit restrictions, free competition, investment, subsidies, progressive taxes, jointly responsible wage policy, etc. The sponsor of our study suggested these items. A Guttman scale of political knowledge was constructed on the basis of replies to these questions. (see Himmelstrand 1960: 194 f).

Obviously political knowledge of this kind would also depend on the educational level of the respondents and on their general exposure in everyday life to mass media and other political information. Therefore an index of exposure to political information – \( Pi \) – was created and controlled for in my study (op.cit. p.186) in order to single out the importance of our main variable – The L-scale. Other possibly influential background variables that were controlled for in our analysis were political cross pressures and intergenerational party shifts in relation to family of origin. Our empirical findings are
accounted for in Figure 2 and they support our theoretical prediction that attitudes with an Independent Emotive Meaning (hi-L) will turn out to be associated with lower scores of attitudinally relevant knowledge than attitudes with a dependent emotive meaning (lo-L), controlling for other possibly confounding non-attitudinal or information variables.

**Figure 2** in about here

Other attitudinally relevant variables that I studied empirically – the saliency of attitudes, the cognitive differentiation of attitudes, the affective differentiation of attitudes and the internal consistency of miniature personal ideologies – will not be accounted for here in detail. I will mention some of these attitudinally significant variables in passing with references to the literature where they seem to me relevant for my concluding remarks. These remarks concern Hans L. Zetterberg’s (2002: xxxiv) interesting notion of maturity in the formation of opinions and of attitudes, and also some observations of mine on religious, moral or political fundamentalism.

**Louis Guttman’s theory of attitude components**

There are some aspects of Louis Guttman’s theory of attitude components, derived formally from a mathematical theory unintelligible to the present author, and seemingly unrelated to common socio-psychological theory of attitudes and behaviour, that will not occupy me here. What is interesting to me, and hopefully to my readers, is the similarity between what I have found in my own empirical research on attitude components, and Guttman’s theoretical and empirical findings on his attitude components closure and involution (Guttman 1954).

I knew nothing about Guttman’s findings when I carried out my own research toward the end of the 50’s. I have already mentioned the saliency of attitudes, the cognitive differentiation and the affective differentiation of attitudes as attitude components that I dealt with in my own research. Unfortunately I never related these variables to basic attitude content as such - which Guttman did with regard to his attitude components – and therefore I cannot compare my own and Guttman’s findings on this particular point. My own theoretical concern was entirely focussed on the role of independent emotive meaning of attitudes as a
key variable determining the amount of relevant knowledge associated with the given attitude, the saliency of the given attitude in the every-day life of the respondent, and its cognitive and affective differentiation. In my research these latter variables were conceived as dependent variables in relation to the so-called L-variable which I later re-labelled as the KEY variable. Here I will retain the labels L-variable and L-scale since they fit the diagrams from 1960 that I will copy in the present paper.

Guttman’s first attitude component is verbal attitude content as such. His second attitude component – intensity with its U-shaped regression line over attitude content – is well known and relatively unimportant to me right here. The third component Guttman interpreted as closure, and it dealt with whether or not the given respondent felt that she was finished with the matter implied by the given attitude – the matter is closed – or whether it still was an open question in her everyday life. A person who definitively has made up her mind with regard to a matter exhibits a high degree of closure. A low degree of closure is indicated if she replies that she has not yet made up her mind about it.

The saliency of an attitude, as measured in my own research (op.cit. pp 166 and 195 f) might be interpreted as the inverse of closure. Someone who returns time and time again to a question has not yet closed her mind. If closure is low, saliency is probably high.

Guttman’s fourth attitude component he calls involution. It is a mental trait, which involves the respondent in brooding over a matter, turning that matter up in her mind over and over again. It would seem to be the opposite of closure – but is it?

Guttman himself would probably never have introduced the question of attitude components the way I have done. To him the mathematical aspect always took precedence, with an emphasis on the different shapes of regression lines of second, third and fourth degree equations – first with one bending point as in a U-shaped curve, secondly with an N-shaped curve with two bending points, and fourthly with a M-shaped or a W-shaped curve with three bending points. Only thereafter - as Guttman himself accounts for the process - he “discovered” by luck, serendipity or psychological intuition that these differently shaped regression lines also happened to conform empirically with those N-shaped and M- or W-shaped regression lines of what he identified as scales of closure and involution over basic attitude content. In figure 3 the reader will find depicted all these curvilinear regression lines.

*Figure 3 in about here*
I would have congratulated Guttman for his serendipity. However, even though I find his conception of the closure and involution variables quite intriguing and possibly fruitful, I am not compelled to accept Guttman’s mathematical derivations, and his concern with curvilinear regression lines of attitude components over attitude content – at least not in the present context. However I believe most strongly that further study of attitude components such as closure and involution in their interrelations with each other and with corresponding behaviour deserve more attention. Of concern to me here is the socio-psychological meaning of the attitude components identified empirically by Guttman and by myself, and their usefulness in pointing out what Hans L. Zetterberg has characterised as “the level of maturity” of public opinion (H.L. Zetterberg, 2002: xxxiv). In diagnosing fundamentalist social movements these attitude components may also be of some help.

Public opinion pollsters are usually satisfied only to deliver percentage distributions for different kinds of opinions or reported behaviour in a given population. But, according to Zetterberg, it would have been even more satisfying if they had ventured to offer some findings in their reports on “the level of maturity” of these opinions. It is in this regard that Guttman’s and my own research on attitude components may turn out to be useful in studying a mature democratic dialogue.

Level of Maturity in Opinion Formation

My interpretation of the concept of “maturity” of an opinion derives from a certain notion of rationality in opinion formation. But here I do not have in mind the usual notion of instrumental rationality. I am not concerned with how able we are in showing off an opinion to others effectively and persuasively. Let me explain what I have in mind instead:

1. Being able to ascertain cognitively the ingredients of what you favour, and their compatibility with each other;
2. Being able to ascertain cognitively the ingredients of what you disfavour, and their interrelationships;
3. Being able to admit and recognise that there possibly are aspects of your favoured alternative that are emotionally less attractive and even distasteful;
4. Being able to admit and recognise that there possibly are aspects of your disfavoured alternative that are attractive and good; and
Finally that you are able to make up your mind rationally about what you want to favour in the long run in spite of your, perhaps, mixed feelings.  

Opinion formation in a given area has reached its level of full maturity, in my understanding, when it has tackled successfully all these 5 items or steps. It remains to be tested empirically to what extent these items or steps are scalable in an ordinal sense.

This is my interpretation of Zetterberg’s concept of maturity in opinion formation. This also would seem to come close to Guttman’s psychological conception of *involution* as an attitude component. In my own research I have constructed reproducible measures of dependent emotive meaning (lo-L), cognitive differentiation (op.cit. p.185) and affective differentiation (op.cit pp. 200f) of political attitudes which all come close to Zetterberg’s notion of opinion maturity and to Guttman’s notion of involution. Points 3 and 4 in the list above are particularly close to items in my scale of affective differentiation. However, as I have indicated already, more empirical research is needed to explore how these variables correlate with each other, and to arrive at a simple index which is informative and cheap enough to be used by pollsters to supplement ordinary percentage distributions of public opinion. The main usefulness of reports on “opinion maturity” is that it provides information on how people have been arriving at, been expressing and defending their opinions.

*The Phenomenon of Fundamentalism*

Theoretically as well as in practical terms the usefulness of the concepts and techniques just introduced show themselves also when we try to understand the phenomena of fundamentalism - religious, moral or political – that are manifesting themselves in our world today.

What is fundamental in fundamentalism is usually a holy scripture who’s very letter is considered sacred, and thus closed for any attempts to reinterpret and to question it. In Guttman’s terminology with which we have become familiar above, we can say that a fundamentalist stand implies a high degree of closure. In terms of the terminology used by me in this paper it is obvious that a fundamentalist creed also implies a high degree of independent emotive meaning of the creed and the attitudes involved. The fundamental letter of the creed is supplied with its own gratification and justification independently of what you may derive from knowledge and exploration of the referents of that creed. We can indeed

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2 Is it possible to have mixed feelings and still be rational? I refer to lexicographic preference theory as explained in Ulf Himmelstrand, ed. 19921992, Chapter 14.
assume that the very emergence of an independent rather than a dependent emotive meaning of an attitude is a result of an orthodox use of that attitude as a sign of legitimate authority and social identity.

Fundamentalism thus provides signs of legitimacy and identity to leaders who claim to be true believers and defenders of the creed, while disqualifying anybody who neglects rallying around the symbol acts of that creed. Fundamentalist faithfulness to the creed as a source of legitimacy becomes particularly important where other sources of legitimacy are rare. For instance, we can expect that political leaders and careerists in a political system that does not deliver democratic electoral support, nor economic progress and social services, nor security in everyday social life, they will use fundamentalism as a source of legitimacy in the absence of those other sources of legitimacy. This will include labelling competitors for power as infidels and as threats to peace and progress, thus deserving punishment or even death.

**Piaget and the Moral Development of Children**

The step from political fundamentalists, prepared to punish their competitors, to young kids debating rules for playing marbles may seem quite large. I once had in mind Piaget’s (1932) famous book on the moral development of children, and his study on how their rule consciousness in playing marbles evolved over time with increasing age. In his conversations with children at the playgrounds of Lausanne, Piaget asked them who might have conceived the rules of the game once upon a time. The youngest children suggested that it must have been some emotionally authoritative figure such as the Lord Major of Lausanne, or perhaps Grand Father with his long grey beard. Children of somewhat older age suggested that the rules of marble might have been invented by previous generations of marble players who took into account what seemed fair and just. Now it turned out that the younger children with their patriarchalist or authoritarian views concerning the origins of rules, did not comply to those rules as minutely as children who considered marble players themselves as being the originators of the rules of the game. It would seem to me that this paradoxical outcome – authoritarian-generated rules being obeyed less minutely – reminds us of the weak correlation we have found between given verbal attitudes and corresponding behaviour when the verbalisation of those attitudes where emotionally rewarding in themselves independently from what they were all about otherwise. In a Piaget-like manner we might perhaps interpret fundamentalism as a less mature, infantile kind of moral consciousness combined
with a cold-hearted, even brutal approach toward deviance – more dangerous, indeed, than breaking rules in marble playing.

Concluding Remarks

What can we learn from this kind of autobiographical rhapsody, if anything?

Looking back on a life-long career as a sociologist I must also ask myself, and indirectly my colleagues, what did survive or will survive in the kind of sociology that was dominant in the academic environments we have known. This kind of query can be taken even further, as a more general question on the very purpose and meaning of sociology as a scientific discipline. In the natural sciences purpose and meaning are indicated by technological applications and practice. Basic to such technological practice is the understanding of causal processes, which abound in the natural world. In the human and social world of the social sciences and the humanities, on the other hand, causality does of course appear but more marginally as compared with finality, rational choice and innovative social organisation. Still the hegemony of thought in sociology for many decades has been stamped by normativistic causality, its basic postulate being that social and cultural norms have shaped society and culture in causal processes called socialisation and acculturation. However, few questions have been asked in that context about the origin of the social and cultural norms and rules that are supposed to have been involved in those processes.

Questioning the normativistic hegemony in sociology was my own starting point in the study of our discipline. The existence and impact of social and cultural norms as such could not be questioned, of course; what could and should be questioned was our sociological understanding of how we learn mechanically by rewards and punishments to behave according to rules and social or cultural norms in the socialisation process. To cut a long story short the hegemonic normativistic account of mainstream sociology failed to indicate clearly who administered those rewards and punishments, and why, and how the pronouncing of normative precepts sometime in themselves could become so imbued with independent emotive force that these norms were transformed from directives for action to emblems of identity and legitimacy serving nothing but the continuation of established power and status. Observations of this nature started me off in two directions:

First of all I became interested in the place of rational choice and innovation in theories of social change, since theories of social norms and normative compliance obviously could not handle problems of change.
Secondly it seemed to me equally obvious that rationality, while being a necessary ingredient in processes of innovation and change, cannot be taken for granted \textit{a priori} (as most economists tend to do) but must be explained and accounted for both when it emerges as an active force, and when it is conspicuously absent. Both of these two points turned out to have been well served by my focus on the “key” L-variable, that is on the independent versus dependent emotive meaning of the language involved in a given area of social change. Both theoretically and empirically it can be demonstrated that the role of rationality and knowledge become more pronounced when the given semantic field holds what Stevenson calls dependent emotive meaning, or even better a medium-L posture, and the reverse when independent emotive meaning is predominant.

Can these theoretically and empirically established facts serve as points of departure for well-informed social practice? While a medical doctor can prescribe a pill or a schedule of physical exercise for his patient, a social scientist has no similar established and effective routines to adopt in his or her social practice. Imagine that a social practitioner could advice a client, say a Chairman of a Charity or a Trade Union, to avoid rallying around normative or attitudinal statements as if they were sacred and rewarding in themselves, etc. Such a piece of social advice is rather unlikely. In its absence we can only hope that a wider debate about sociological findings such as those reported here and elsewhere will contribute to what Hans L. Zetterberg has called maturity in public opinion. In his book \textit{Social Theory and Social Practice} (op.cit.) he has discussed how such practical applications of social science can come about. Other types of practical application such as the psychological manipulation of crowd behaviour we can do without.

The practical application of social science only rarely takes the character of structural construction and social engineering or manipulation. What remains as a possible avenue of social practice is the communication of rational insights about the promising, facilitating or hampering ingredients of a current situation and their internal contradictions and compatibilities, and of proposals concerning ways of resolving such contradictions in a democratic manner. Ideally this requires an arena cleansed from slogans imbued with independent emotive meaning. Practical application of the social sciences, sociology included, is then nothing more than conveying a rational understanding of the given situation – its forces and actors - so that we can cope with it. How to make this feasible is another good old story called “raising critical consciousness”. Or in Zetterberg’s terminology – attaining maturity.
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Transaction Publishers.
Figures and Tables

to be inserted in

Ulf Himmelstrand’s paper

On Theory & Method in the Study of
Independent Emotive Meaning
of Attitudinal Statements
An *L*-scale of Political Attitudes

### Table 1

<table>
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32. Do you think it is difficult to have an opinion about such things as we have just talked about—government, freedom, the common good—or do you think—Oh, well, you can always have some opinion? (Answer categories *NOT* to be mentioned)

1. Difficult to have an opinion since one never thinks about these things.
2. Difficult to have an opinion since there are so many facts to consider before taking a stand.
3. One can always have an opinion.
4. Easy to have an opinion about such things.

33a. To discuss and try to change the opinions one has is not quite to my liking. One either has an opinion or one does not.—Do you agree or do you not agree with this? SHOW CARD

1. Agree absolutely
2. Agree more or less
3. Doubtful
4. Do not quite agree
5. Absolutely do not agree

33b. If you think about too many facts when forming an opinion you get lost, and it is not necessary to go so far. SHOW CARD

1 2 3 4 5

33c. It is a matter of principle what opinion you hold regarding a question, and nothing in the world can change what you feel is right. SHOW CARD

1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2

Political Knowledge by the $L$-scale

(a) hi-Pi & uni-press & no intergen. party shift

(b) hi-Pi & cross-press & no intergen. party shift

(c) hi-Pi & intergen. party shift

N = 49 82 62 41

N = 30 11 16

N = 8 8 16 6

(d) lo-Pi & uni-press & no intergen. party shift

(e) lo-Pi & cross-press & no intergen. party shift

(f) lo-Pi & intergen. party shift

N = 35 68 76 65

N = 17 39 23 38

N = 20 19 23
Figure 3

Guttman's Attitude Components

Closure & Involution

Theoretical regression lines over
Attitude Content

NOTE: My original intention was to include right here some empirical findings on attitude component regression lines that I had obtained in a personal correspondence directly from Louis Guttman. Unfortunately that letter has been lost, and so far I have not been able to collect another copy of his report, with its empirical data and thorough theoretical discussion. With the kind help of Dr. Shlomit Levy, Jerusalem University, I hope to pursue this matter successfully. Guttman's research about attitude components deserves becoming better known.