



Seminar

## HANS ROTT

Fellow, SCAS.

Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Universität Regensburg

### *A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements*

Tuesday, 2 February, 11:15 a.m.

In the Thunberg Lecture Hall  
SCAS, Linneanum, Thunbergsvägen 2, Uppsala  
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C O L L E G I U M  
*for* ADVANCED STUDY

## ABOUT HANS ROTT

Hans Rott studied philosophy and logic at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. He received his Ph.D. in 1991 for the thesis *Reduktion und Revision: Aspekte des nichtmonotonen Theorienwandels*. He was Assistant Professor at Universität Konstanz, where he completed his habilitation in 1997. From 1997 to 1999, he was Professor of Logic and the Cognitive Sciences at the University of Amsterdam. Since 1999, he has been Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Universität Regensburg. He served as editor-in-chief of the journal *Erkenntnis* from 2001 to 2011, and as a vice president of the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie from 2003 to 2012. He is a member of Leopoldina Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften.

From 2010 to 2013, Rott was one of two co-leaders of the interdisciplinary research project ‘Knowledge and Meaning in Literature’. Another project, ‘Reasoning with Conditionals in a Qualitative Cognitive Framework’, started in the summer of 2015 and is connected to his research at SCAS. His publications include ‘Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice’, *Journal of Symbolic Logic* (1993); *Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Non-monotonic Reasoning* (Oxford University Press, 2001); ‘Two Dogmas of Belief Revision’, *The Journal of Philosophy* (2000); ‘Revision by Comparison’, *Artificial Intelligence* (with E. Fermé, 2004); ‘Re-approaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (2011); and ‘A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements’, *Erkenntnis* (2015).

At SCAS, Rott will work with Igor Douven (Paris), Paul Egré (Paris) and John Cantwell (Stockholm) on ‘Everyday Reasoning and Logic’.

## ABSTRACT

This talk addresses the situation of a dispute in which one speaker says *A* and a second speaker says *not-A*. Proceeding on an idealising distinction between “basic” and “interesting” claims that may be formulated in a given idiolectal language, we will ask how it might be sorted out whether the dispute reflects a genuine (substantive) disagreement, or whether the speakers are only having a merely verbal (terminological) dispute, due to their using different “interesting” concepts. Four individually plausible principles for the determination of the nature of a dispute are shown to be incompatible. The question whether Sarai lied in the story told in *Genesis 12* will be discussed as an example.