Pro Futura Scientia Fellow, SCAS.
Researcher, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
Project Coordinator, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm

Hybrid event.
Zoom Webinar: https://uu-se.zoom.us/j/65802739142 External link.

ABSTRACT:
According to standard decision theory, a decision is rational just in case it maximizes expected value. While this theory works very well in simple, somewhat artificial cases, it is difficult to apply to the complex choices we face in real life. In my talk I will discuss two such challenges, which stem from the fact that the theory requires that the value of a possible outcome can be represented by a single real number.

One problem is that such numerical representations of value often seem unreasonably precise. Why would the value of a life-long friendship, say, be exactly 150 “units” of value, rather than 151 such units? This is the problem of vagueness in values. Another problem is that when values of very different kinds are at stake, it is hard to find a “common currency” which can represent them all. For example, how can we compare the value of a life-long friendship to the value of a new scientific discovery? Why think they are comparable at all? This is the problem of incomparability in values.

While these problems are genuine, I will argue that they need not be fatal. What they do show, however, is that we need to rethink how values can be structured and represented. If time permits, I will also consider some implications of these problems for research policy, concerning for example decisions about research funding.